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in the 1990s 
Osvaldo Sunkel* 
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This article is a critical reflection on lhe long-term 
development strategies currently being proposed by the 
neo-liberal and neo-structuralist schools. Obviously, a given 
theoretical programme can turn out to be substantially 
different when put into practice and can be conditioned by 
the particular characteristics of each country. Nevertheless, 
we choose to limit our consideration to the proposals 
themselves in order to place the discussion on the most 
objective and most realistic level possible. 
After a brief introduction, the basic elements of 
the neo-liberal proposal for structural adjustment and 
growth are summarized; these are based on recent versions 
representative of the orthodox line of analysis. The second 
section presents the neo-structuralist response to the 
neo-liberal proposal, centring the analysis on the basic 
policy guidelines arising from the new proposed strategy for 
development "from within". 
Finally, a critical comparison is made of the basic 
principles underlying the two proposals, in the type (hat 
they will afford positive guidance for tackling the major 
problems of economic policy and development in Latin 
America. 
•Special Advisor to the Executive Secretary of 
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The authors wish to thank Héctor Assael and Osvaldo 
Larra naga for their comments on this article. 
Introduction 
When the problem of the external debt arose in 1982, 
with Mexico's moratorium and the consequent abrupt 
cut-off of the flow of external capital, an economic 
and financial crisis of huge proportions was 
unleashed in most underdeveloped countries, 
especially in Latin America. This crisis, owing to its 
magnitude and its dramatic effects, has been called by 
most economic analysts the worst crisis since the 
depression of the 1930s. 
Faced with the impossibility of financing the 
heavy external deficit in a context of severe 
deterioration of the terms of trade, high international 
interest rates and no access to voluntary external 
credit, all the Latin American countries have 
negotiated periodically with the multilateral credit 
agencies, especially the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. The purpose of these 
negotiations is to reprogramme the debt service and 
ease the restricted access to new financial resources, 
in order to soften the destabilizing domestic impact 
of these deficits on the external accounts. 
As is well known, these agencies have granted 
new credits on the condition that the debtor countries 
initiate a series of economic, political and institu-
tional reforms along marked neo-liberal lines. 
Because of their extensive short-term and long-term 
effects, these reforms are known as "structural 
adjustment" programmes. Their explicit objective is 
to recover the macroeconomic balance and the 
potential growth rate, in order to ensure the balance of 
payments over the middle term (Michalopoulos, 
1987). 
However, whatever strategy has been followed 
until now, the negative effects of the external-debt 
crisis have not been overcome. Moreover, most of the 
countries of the region have not recovered sustained 
growth; on the contrary, the basic disequilibria have 
become noticeably worse. Latin America's per capita 
income stagnated throughout the 1980s and remained 
much below the levels attained at the end of the 
1970s. This trend continues in most of the countries, 
producing regressive social effects and severe 
political conflicts, with unpredictable consequences 
for the recently restored democracies. Faced with this 
gloomy picture, economists have described the 1980s 
as a lost decade for Latin American development. 
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The situation has prompted a serious effort to 
grasp the real nature of the economic problems in all 
their complexity, in order to elaborate alternative 
solutions for the twofold challenge facing the 
Governments of the region. They must overcome the 
crisis and return to the path of solid and sustained 
growth, in a democratic spirit and with equity. This 
effort has taken shape, for example, in the recent 
Neo-liberal analysts agree that one of the immediate 
causes of the economic crisis in Latin America is the 
international recession of the 1980s, especially the 
sharp declines in export prices and the severe rises in 
real international interest rates, causing a huge deficit 
in the region's external accounts. The situation 
worsened when the flow of private external inancing, 
at one time abundant, was abruptly and severely 
reduced. However, the neo-liberalists feel that the 
debt problem only revealed and intensified much 
deeper problems which were already present in the 
Latin American economies and indeed which had 
been identified before the crisis (Balassa et ah, 1986). 
Some of the reasons that led these authors to such 
a conclusion were the rapid recovery of other 
developing countries at least as seriously affected as 
those of the region, and the deterioration of the 
relative long-term economic situation of Latin 
America. This deterioration was apparent in the 
capital flight from some countries caused by loss of 
confidence in their development possibilities; in high 
rates of unemployment and underemployment; in 
periodic outbreaks and surges of inflation; and in the 
appalling income distribution characteristic of most 
countries. 
For Balassa and his collaborators, these problems 
arose especially from mistaken and unsustainable 
domestic policies and institutions. Important among 
these are the notable tendency of the Latin American 
economies towards inward-looking growth, and 
especially their readiness to allow their currencies to 
be overvalued and to continue with highly 
protectionist policies. They failed to provide 
incentives to save, both domestically and externally, 
and allocated inefficiently the savings that did exist. 
proposals on "changing production patterns with 
social equity" (ECLAC, 1990) and "development 
from within" (O. Sunkel, in press). Such proposals 
are especially but not exclusively inspired by the 
Latin American school of structuralist thought, 
renewed and reformulated by the neo-structuralist 
contribution of the last decade. 
Completing this bleak panorama were the excessive 
importance and suffocating role of the State in the 
economy and the subsequent weakness of the private 
sector. 
Even though these authors do not explicitly call 
for structural adjustment of the same magnitude as we 
know today, their pioneering efforts to design a new 
development strategy, which they define as "urgently 
necessary and of proven feasibility" for recovering 
growth, aptly represent the current direction of the 
new orthodox proposals on adjustment and growth. 
From this standpoint, the economic challenge that the 
countries of the region must confront is to find some 
efficient way of recovering self-sustained growth 
which would guarantee productive employment to a 
growing population and re-establish the confidence of 
the external financial markets by serving the debt 
"without fail and on time". In the same way, the new 
policies should have an immediate positive social 
impact, in order to recover previous living standards, 
strengthen the incipient and widespread return to 
democracy, and favour private initiative. In addition, 
and in a spirit of global economic interdependence, 
the developed countries should complement the new 
development strategies with their own efforts to have 
sustained and sustaining policies. 
In more specific terms, the proposal of Balassa 
and his collaborators presents four strategic action 
areas for the Latin American countries: 
1
 This section is essentially based on three works that are 
representative of the recent literature on structural adjustment: 
Balassa et ai, (1986), Michalopoulos (1987) and Selowsky (1989). 
Within this same perspective, see also the works of Barandiaran 
(1988), Rodríguez (1989) and Williamson (1990). 
I 
Structural adjustment and growth: the neo-liberal response to the 
crisis of economic growth in Latin America1 
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a) They must orient their economic policy 
toward the exterior, giving particular attention to 
exports and to the efficient substitution of imports by 
maintaining competitive exchange rates, avoiding 
excessive protection on imports and providing 
incentives for internationally accepted exports. 
b) They must increase and allocate domestic 
savings efficiently to investment projects, on the basis 
of positive (but not excessive) real interest rates; a 
fiscal policy that encourages saving instead of 
consumption; the reduction of budgetary deficits 
because of their effects on inflation and their 
displacement of productive investment; and 
incentives for the entry of foreign private capital, 
particularly in ways that do not create debt, such as 
direct foreign invtstment and efforts to reverse capital 
flight; 
c) They must reform the role of the State in the 
economy, by a considerable degree of market 
deregulation as an impetus for entrepreneurial 
dynamism; a reduction of the State's function as a 
producer of goods and services (privatization), and 
the concentration of its action on the provision of 
social services and the establishment of a stable 
overall framework for growth with supportive macro 
and micro-economic policies; 
d) They must obtain international support for 
this strategy, especially from the United States and 
the industrialized countries, through a commitment on 
their part to maintain world economic growth rates of 
at least 3% a year, by adopting measures to liberalize 
world trade that avoid new restrictions on imports and 
subsidies for exports; by supporting the reduction of 
the United States budget deficit and lower margins for 
the creditor banks in order to ensure lower real 
interest rates for debtor countries; and, finally, 
through a substantial contribution of new funds for 
Latin America of around US$20 billion a year, from 
the private sector, the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the World Bank. 
The changes these authors suggest would make 
for greater international competitiveness, encourage 
growth and the creation of sources of productive 
employment, and would increase export revenues for 
servicing the debt. The stimulation of private 
initiative would more than compensate for the job 
losses caused by reducing public enterprises and 
lifting government regulations. At the same time, a 
successful move towards the exterior would generate 
economic benefits that would offset the losses arising 
from the gradual elimination of non-productive 
activities. Existing resources and the recovery of 
investment would move towards the more productive 
sectors, with higher wages and a more intensive use 
of labour. 
Finally, Balassa and his collaborators state that a 
key element for guaranteeing the success of this 
strategy is continuity of policy, in order to generate a 
reasonably stable economic scenario for long-term 
plans and the confidence of private investors. The 
necessary adjustments, to the extent that they change 
external conditions and those derived from national 
development, should not affect the coherence nor the 
continuity of the purpose and direction of the new 
strategy. 
Domestic challenges aside, external support is 
vital for the success of the strategy for adjustment 
with growth. However, since foreign creditor banks 
are unwilling to renew the voluntary flow of credit, 
our countries have become overly dependent on 
negotiations with the multilateral financial agencies, 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
These agencies conditioned access to new financing 
on the application of a new programme of reforms in 
the indebted economies, which because of their 
wide-ranging scope have been called "structural 
adjustments". 
The proposals contained in a structural adjust-
ment programme are generally similar to those of the 
strategy outlined by Balassa and others (1986). Even 
so, the structural adjustment programmes include 
new, more sophisticated elements that adapt them to a 
changing reality, especially with respect to the 
depth, speed and sequence of the economic reforms 
that have to be introduced, as well as the 
macroeconomic policies appropriate for the transition 
towards a less distorted economy (Michalopoulos, 
1987).3 
The financial assistance programmes of the International 
Monetary Fund and the structural adjustment programmes of the 
World Bank are the most representative practical examples of the 
new face of neo-liberal orthodoxy. Moreover, both agencies are 
expected to develop even closer relations and coordination of their 
stabilization and adjustment policies (Meller, 1988). 
3
 Michalopoulos' article is especially representative of the 
current line of thinking of the international financial agencies, 
particularly the World Bank. Consequently, and as stated in the 
introduction, our presentation of these issues closely follows the 
development of Michalopoulos' own study. 
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The World Bank's view, as presented by 
Michalopoulos, gives high priority to the task of 
confronting significant and prolonged domestic 
aggregate disequilibria (inflation and balance-of-
payments deficit), because of their inevitable negative 
effects on long-term growth. Otherwise, the delay in 
re-establishing minimum macro-economic stability 
will worsen the impact of the subsequent adjustment 
on the short-term product. As part of the stabilization 
efforts, it is recommended that domestic consumption 
be reduced to levels compatible with the potential 
growth of the product and the sustainable deficit on 
current account. The World Bank also points out in 
passing that declines in activity over the short term 
are practically a prerequisite for the success of a 
stabilization programme, since that success depends 
on the application of contractive measures to the 
economy as a whole. 
The key to adjustment with growth, according to 
the World Bank, lies in the right combination and 
balanced handling of the instruments of monetary, 
fiscal and exchange policies, which, for a given level 
of external financing, fulfil objectives of stabilization, 
promote structural change and cost less in terms of 
growth over the short run. On the other hand, if the 
general macroeconomic imbalance has one particular 
cause (the "fiscal deficit" in Latin America), all the 
actions of the policy package should be directed to 
solving that problem, but without concentrating on 
public investments in physical and social 
infrastructure that compromise the possibilities of 
future growth. Also, every stabilization programme 
should avoid introducing distortions that could ruin 
the success of the adjustment. Specifically, if a 
country needs to eliminate a bias against exports and 
allocate resources to the production of tradeable 
goods, the real exchange rate should not be raised nor 
should taxes be levied on exports as instruments for 
stabilization. 
Since stabilization alone does not guarantee 
growth, the specific components of a policy package 
for promoting structural change and growth need to 
be considered. Although the starting points are 
different in each country, the policies that require 
priority attention are as follows: 
a) To increase public saving by reducing 
expenditures and increasing revenues to broaden the 
tax base, and by improving tax collection. This can be 
done by privatizing public enterprises or improving 
their management by drastically reducing subsidies 
for prices or public utility services for the middle 
class, and consequently by directing the distributive 
action of the State towards groups in extreme poverty 
or highly vulnerable groups. 
b) To increase private savings, which requires 
strengthening domestic financial institutions and 
maintaining a stable and predictable economic policy. 
c) To achieve greater economic efficiency and 
improve private investment by eliminating micro-
economic distortions such as price controls, highly 
differentiated incentives in the area of external trade, 
subsidized interest rates, credit rationing, and 
impediments to labour mobility and adjustments of 
real wages. In a highly regulated economy, the alloca-
tion of resources and productivity can be improved by 
eliminating price controls and simultaneously 
deregulating the domestic labour market. In addition, 
the deregulation of financial markets (subject to 
appropriate regulations for bank supervision) 
improves the allocation of credit and distributes 
investment more efficiently. 
d) To allocate public investment more efficiently 
by redistributing public resources towards activities 
that merit greater positive externalities, such as the 
development of human resources and physical 
infrastructure. 
e) To increase the supply of tradeable goods, 
which calls for two important policy measures: the 
maintenance of an appropriate real exchange rate and 
a correct incentive structure, giving equal treatment to 
production for the domestic market and production 
for export. This last point demands, as a minimum, 
the elimination of the bias against exports prevalent in 
many countries by liberalizing and rationalizing the 
system of external trade, which includes removing 
quantitative restrictions, reducing tariffs and 
eventually making them uniform, and diminishing or 
eliminating as far as possible taxes on exports. 
Obviously, liberalization will cause a contraction in 
inefficient sectors, which will eventually be replaced 
by the corresponding expansion of efficient sectors, 
giving shape to a new productive structure better 
adapted to the demands of international competition 
and better prepared to face external shocks. 
Michalopoulos, in another part of his article, 
emphasizes that, despite the broad consensus about 
the nature of the reform package in question, 
disagreements abound once implementation begins, 
since less is known about how the reform actually 
works; that depends partially on the conditions in 
place at the beginning of implementation and partially 
on the political situation of each country. As 
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mentioned above, three important elements must be 
introduced at this point in the discussion: the 
sequence of the reforms, their speed and the 
appropriate macroeconomic policy package. 
The debate about the sequence of economic 
reforms involves two questions. First, what is the 
correct sequence between measures for achieving 
stabilization and those for structural adjustment? 
Second, how can we establish the appropriate order 
for eliminating distortions in regulated markets? As 
regards the first question, there are only minor 
disagreements about whether structural adjustment is 
easier if it takes place in a stable macroeconomic 
context, especially when inflation is under control. 
The basic reason is that, when both programmes are 
applied simultaneously, the net contractive pressure 
on the productive apparatus can be too strong and 
lead to bankruptcies, transitory unemployment and 
other costs, such as a growing political opposition, 
that would seriously compromise the viability of the 
reforms. 
As regards the question of the order of measures 
for eliminating domestic market distortions related to 
the liberalization of international economic relations, 
the experience of different countries gathered by the 
World Bank shows that the deregulation of the 
domestic labour market should precede other reforms, 
in order to guarantee the necessary mobility of labour 
and thus achieve the benefits of the reforms in the 
goods market. In the same way, it is considered 
important to undertake at an early stage the reform of 
the domestic financial markets that operate in a 
context of credit rationing; interest rates on loans 
should be liberalized first and then those on deposits. 
As regards external accounts proper, it is considered 
better to first liberalize the current account of the 
balance of payments, leaving the opening of the 
capital account for later. The argument for this 
position is that it prevents capital from flowing 
towards inefficient sectors that enjoy an artificially 
According to the author, this is because of the links between 
stabilization and liberalization of the trade system. On the one 
hand, successful stabilization depends on the application of 
contractive measures in the aggregate, and on the other, the 
rationalization of trade policies alms to reduce the activity of highly 
protected Import-substitution industries. This does not mean that 
other aspects of structural adjustment, such as the rationalization of 
public expenditures, for example, cannot be approached at the same 
time as stabilization, especially when recognizing that the success 
of stabilization can depend on such action being undertaken early 
in the process. 
high profit margin due to protectionist measures. 
More important, it prevents the more rapid 
adjustment of the capital market from starting a huge 
movement of capital with undesirable effects on the 
real exchange rate. 
As to the speed of the reforms, the debate centres 
on whether the trade opening should be achieved in a 
short period or take from five to 10 years, and 
whether price controls should be eliminated im-
mediately or gradually. It is important to consider 
here the crucial role played by price expectations, and 
therefore, the importance of credibility for any reform 
package. Reform initiatives, for these reasons, should 
be programmed with a realistic time frame which 
allows them to achieve their objectives. These will 
differ from one kind of policy to another and from 
one country to another. Thus, the greater the initial 
imbalance, the faster the pace for implementing the 
reforms, and the more conditions of political 
feasibility are ignored, the greater will be the costs of 
the transition provoked by the structural adjustment 
programme, causing a serious risk of failure and a 
loss of credibility for future adjustment efforts. In any 
case, a delay in applying the policies will retard the 
development of export activities and interest groups 
that support them. Needed reforms in the allocation 
of resources will not take place unless the signals 
given are sufficiently strong and clear to make the 
changes credible. 
Finally, in the area of macroeconomic policies 
that accompany the adjustment process, numerous 
and complex tasks are suggested for the moment 
when external accounts are liberalized. These are to 
achieve simultaneously an appropriate and stable 
level of the exchange rate, a lower rate of inflation 
and a sustainable position in the balance of payments. 
At the same time, other macroeconomic instruments 
should be designed to support liberalization. These 
include a monetary policy compatible with current 
exchange regulations and with inflationary expecta-
tions, thus avoiding a crisis of confidence that could 
ruin the success of the whole package. Fiscal policy 
should be conducted in such a way that budget 
deficits are kept at levels consistent with the levels of 
expansion of domestic credit and with the availability 
of external financing. 
Selowsky presents a very innovative and 
representative vision of this new approach by the 
World Bank (Selowsky, 1989).5 In this study, the 
5Also see Rosales (1990). 
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author identifies a logical sequence of three stages in 
the adjustment process through which the Latin 
American countries must pass in order to recover 
growth and reduce their levels of external indebt-
edness. An important point in Selowsky's analysis, 
which deserves to be highlighted, is the strong 
complementarity that he postulates between 
improvements in domestic policies and support from 
external financing. Even though he states that the 
precise way in which that complementarity functions 
is different in each stage of the adjustment, the author 
recognizes that domestic economic reforms without 
additional external financing are risky for the whole 
process, making the adjustment socially and 
politically rather costly. Nor would it be helpful to 
have external support and fail to undertake the 
necessary reforms, since the funds would ultimately 
become part of capital flight or finance unproductive 
government consumption or investment projects with 
little social benefit. 
The main objective of each stage of the 
adjustment is to create the preconditions, or the 
atmosphere, which stimulate a high level of socially 
productive investments by the private sector, both 
local and international, which is identified as the 
motor of growth. For the author, the solution of the 
over-indebtedness of the Latin American countries 
will also contribute to this climate. In many cases this 
involves a significant reduction of the debt rather than 
a continuous reprogramming of payments on the 
principal and interest. 
The basic goal of the first stage is to achieve a 
solid foundation for macroeconomic stability by 
reducing inflation and the real interest rate. This 
demands action on two fronts: to generate a sustained 
growth of the primary fiscal surplus (revenues minus 
expenditures, except for interest payments), and to 
achieve a critical level of external financing or lower 
net transfers of resources, which will mitigate the 
recessive effects of such a fiscal adjustment. A 
particularly new element in the policy 
recommendations made by Selowsky for this stage of 
the adjustment is his recognition of the less recessive 
character of some measures contained in the 
heterodox plans for stabilization. These are related to 
transitory agreements governing wages and prices in 
a way that guarantees the rapid convergence of the 
inflation rate at a level compatible with the new rate 
of monetary expansion. 
Once a minimum level of macroeconomic 
stability is achieved, the second stage begins with the 
implementation of profound structural reforms aimed 
at increasing both external and domestic competi-
tiveness in goods, inputs and financial markets, 
together with the rationalization of the overall system 
of regulations and institutional reforms that promote a 
sustained increase of public saving. The policies seek 
an efficient reallocation of resources and the recovery 
of import levels and full productive capacity. They 
include trade reforms that give the same incentives 
to exports as to import substitution; deregulation 
of interest rates and the decompression of the 
financial system; and open-door policies for foreign 
investment. In sum, the incentives should be based on 
transparent rules of the game and on market signals 
instead of the discretional allocation of resources by 
way of public policy. Finally, it is hoped, that at this 
stage additional external financing will be used to 
import intermediate inputs, making possible a better 
use of installed capacity. 
The third stage consolidates the reforms. The 
main objective is the sustained recovery of 
investment levels. Here the preconditions for 
sustained growth are in place and they can be seen in 
the desire of private local investors to invest within 
the country because of its high levels of social and 
private productivity. Tlie only constraint to growth is 
the rationing of external financing despite high 
interest rates and a strong demand for investment 
funds. Consequently, at this stage external financing 
is not only crucial for increasing domestic private 
investment; it is also essential to reduce the level of 
external overindebtedness of the Latin American 
economies, in order to mitigate the climate of 
uncertainty, increase the confidence of local investors 
and ensure that external shocks or prolonged 
negotiations of the debt do not threaten the structural 
reforms already achieved. 
In this brief summary we have tried to present as 
objectively as possible the main lines of the proposal 
for structural adjustment and growth, put forward by 
the international financial agencies. At the end of this 
article we will deal with the central aspects of this 
proposal which merit criticism. 
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II 
Development from within: a neo-structuralist response to the problems of 
Latin American development6 
From a specifically Latin American perspective, the 
present advocates of neo-structuralism affirm that the 
main economic problems and the underdevelopment 
still prevalent in our countries are due not so much to 
distortions induced by economic policies as to 
historical causes of an endogenous and structural 
nature. In the opinion of Rosales (1988), the truth of 
this theory is revealed in three crucial characteristics 
of the Latin American economy at the end of the 
1980s: a) a continuing pattern of external insertion 
which, given the trends in international trade and the 
international financial system, leads to an 
impoverishing specialization; b) the predominance of 
an uncoordinated production apparatus, which is 
vulnerable and highly heterogeneous, concentrates 
technical progress, and is incapable of absorbing 
productively the growth of the labour force; c) the 
persistence of a very concentrated and exclusive 
income distribution, which reveals the system's 
incapacity to reduce poverty. 
Consequently, our countries must do more than 
carry out marginal adjustments to the change curve -a 
reflection of their exclusive preoccupation with the 
efficient allocation of productive factors. They must 
generate a dynamic process that gradually moves the 
economy towards the curve of production 
possibilities and continuously and accumulatively 
pushes this curve towards new productive frontiers. In 
particular, this movement must be capable of 
generating a dynamic insertion into the international 
economy and of responding to the need to increase 
the production of the poorer sectors. Hence growth 
demands more than a policy of liberalization designed 
to promote correct prices for an optimum allocation 
of productive factors in a static situation and in 
conditions of an extremely unequal distribution of 
income. On the contrary, the interplay of the market 
should be significantly complemented by dynamic 
action on the part of the State. Apart from its classical 
functions (public property, macroeconomic equilibria, 
equity), the State should include within the range of 
6
 This section is based on Ramos and Sunkel (1990). 
7
 A more profound analysis and background documents 
which support this kind of analysis are found in the works of 
Ocampo (1990), Tokman (1990) and Lustig (1990). 
its administrative capacity: a) the promotion or 
simulation of markets that are lacking (long-term 
capital markets, currency futures markets); b) the 
strengthening of incomplete markets (technology 
market); c) the elimination or reduction of structural 
distortions (the asymmetrical character of external 
insertion, heterogeneity of the productive structure, 
the concentration of property, the fragmentation of 
the capital and labour markets); d) the elimination of, 
or compensation for, the more important defects in 
the market arising from output at different scales; 
e) externalities and the learning process (in the 
industrial or external sector), among others. 
These are the basic policy guidelines behind 
recent efforts to present a renewed strategic proposal 
for the recovery and consolidation of development in 
Latin America (ECLAC, 1990 and Sunkel, éd., 1990). 
In line with the initial neo-structuralist analysis, both 
alternatives provide concrete propositions for shaping 
a productive structure that allows for dynamic 
growth, ensures an efficient insertion of our countries 
in the world economy, increases the generation of 
productive employment and reduces structural 
heterogeneity. In this way, income distribution will be 
enhanced and the extreme poverty of most Latin 
Americans will be alleviated. 
As regards the general guidelines outlined by 
Sunkel, the strategy of development "from within" 
seeks to take up once again and go beyond Prebisch's 
original challenge to industrialize. The aim is to 
generate an endogenous accumulation process that 
absorbs and generates technical advances -including 
the use of foreign private investment. This process 
will give a country its own decision-making capacity 
for dynamic growth. Such a strategic concept is not 
biased a priori in favour of import substitution, 
which would ultimately lead it into a blind alley. On 
the contrary, this proposal leaves open the options to 
orient industrialization from within to the priority 
domestic and external markets which are more 
promising for the long-term development strategy. In 
these markets our countries already have or can 
acquire levels of relative excellence which would 
guarantee them a solid insertion into the world 
economy. 
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In other words, it is not so much a question of 
demand. What is vital is a dynamic effort on the 
supply side: accumulation, quality, flexibility; the 
combination and efficient use of productive 
resources; the deliberate incorporation of technical 
progress, innovation and creativity; organizational 
capacity, social harmony and discipline; frugal 
private and public consumption and emphasis on 
national savings, and the acquisition of the capacity to 
insert the national economy dynamically into the 
world economy. In short, our countries must make a 
deliberate effort "from within", with the active 
participation of the State and private economic 
agents, to achieve self-sustained development. 
Some elements of ECLAC's proposal for 
changing production patterns with social equity 
(1990) come very close to this conception. Devel-
opment "from within" is clearly identified with the 
criterion of genuine competitiveness which seeks to 
progress from the "perishable income" derived from 
natural resources to the "dynamic income" derived 
from the incorporation of technical progress into 
productive activity. Likewise, both proposals stress 
the systematic character of this competitiveness, and 
therefore, the integral effort demanded by a dynamic 
insertion into world markets. They recognize that in 
the economies that compete in those markets the 
individual firm is integrated into a broad network of 
linkages with the educational system, with the 
technological, energy and transport infrastructure, 
with employer-worker relations, with public and 
private institutions and with the financial system. 
Another important element in both proposals is 
the commitment to re-establish and maintain basic 
macroeconomic equilibria as a necessary condition 
for achieving the sustainability of the development 
process. One of the ways of doing this is to reduce 
external transfers as debt service. However, such a 
reduction will be insufficient if it is not accompanied 
by domestic stabilization policies which regain 
control of fiscal accounts (including increased public 
revenues and not just reduced expenditures) and 
which serve as a guide for expectations through a 
suitable management of prices and income in order to 
minimize the recessive impact of greater fiscal 
discipline. Adjustment policies should stimulate the 
reallocation of resources towards the production of 
tradeable goods with particularly strong incentives 
during the first few years, especially for exports. In 
the interests of social efficiency, the adjustment 
should be gradual; in the case of high inflation, shock 
policies are more appropriate and inevitable. In 
practice this approach differs from the traditional 
recommendations of the International Monetary 
Fund, which are usually too drastic as regards 
adjustment and too gradualist as regards inflation 
(Ramos, 1990). 
An essential objective which affects every aspect 
of the neo-structuralist agenda for development is to 
achieve equity and social justice and to strengthen 
democratic institutions. In the context of the 
constraints imposed by the economic crisis, top 
priority must be given to problems of extreme poverty 
and to policies designed to alleviate and eradicate it 
once and for all. Once back on the road to stable 
growth, basic medium- and long-term changes to 
achieve greater equity can be introduced to overcome 
the high degree of heterogeneity prevalent in the 
productive structure. 
For this purpose, the State must concentrate on 
three priority aims: a) to minimize the impact of 
external shocks on the poorer and more vulnerable 
groups by supporting their production and 
productivity as well as their income levels and social 
services; b) to lower the costs of relocating manpower 
associated with the structural reforms inherent in the 
adjustment; c) to facilitate the eradication of poverty 
and the excessive concentration of income and 
wealth, once growth has been recovered (Lustig, 
1990). Also, in order to improve the functioning of 
the labour markets and the absorption of manpower, it 
is imperative to adopt a new strategy that takes 
serious account of the informal sector. As a result of 
the recent crisis, this sector has expanded and 
contains a high concentration of poor people. There is 
increasing evidence that only a small amount of 
resources is needed to promote their activity. There 
are two schools of thought on this point, which are 
not necessarily contradictory, but have a different 
emphasis and involve different proposals. The first 
attempts to solve the structural problems affecting the 
existence, duration and operation of the informal 
sector; the second deals with the institutional aspects 
and centres its analysis primarily on the current 
juridical order, transferring the cause of the problem, 
in a certain sense, from the structural to the juridical 
level (Tokman, 1990). 
ECLAC's proposal (1990), accentuating this 
tendency to emphasize production more than social 
assistance, suggests that the changes in production 
patterns should be accompanied by complementary 
measures for redistribution. These include 
NEO-STRUCTURALISM VERSUS NEO-IJBERAIJSM IN TIIE 1990s / O. Sw;|(7 snd G.Zuleta 43 
programmes of technical, financial and marketing 
services that support microenterprises, own-account 
workers and small farmers. The proposal also 
emphasizes the urgency of reforming different 
regulatory mechanisms that prevent the formation of 
microenterprises with the capacity to change. 
Notwithstanding the importance of defining this 
general strategic framework, any attempt to formulate 
a modern and influential neo-structuralist proposal 
also acquires a realistic approach in order to pinpoint 
the most important problems and work out practical 
proposals to solve them. In order to observe the 
neo-structuralist contribution to economic policy, we 
examine below how the advocates of that school of 
thought would tackle certain basic economic 
problems at this time, and what proposals they would 
suggest to deal with the structural and institutional 
problems, as well as the problem of prices. 
1. Changing and modernizing production patterns 
Already in the 1960s there were warnings that 
import-substitution policy was creating a lopsided 
structure of incentives, favouring production for the 
domestic market, and that it needed to be 
reformulated (ECLAC, 1961). It is logical to suppose 
that, if the incentives for generating foreign exchange 
through export expansion were equal to the incentives 
for saving foreign exchange through import 
substitution, exports would respond more. And if 
another special incentive were needed, it would be for 
insertion into the external market -the real "infant 
industry" of the future. In this way, instead of import 
tariffs, it would be more important to subsidize the 
exports of pioneer enterprises that introduce new 
products and open up new external markets. Owing to 
the process of import substitution in the past, imports 
today consist almost entirely of capital inputs and 
goods; tariffs should therefore be reduced and 
rationalized to facilitate exports and competitive 
substitution. The. output of the multinational 
corporations established in the region should also be 
exported; advantage should be taken of their 
international marketing network; and export 
commitments should be negotiated in exchange for 
the purchase of inputs at current international prices. 
Basically, what is proposed is a selective intervention 
that seeks to establish dynamic comparative 
advantages in international markets, since exporting 
is the natural next step to take in order to benefit from 
the industrial base already in existence. 
Within this logic of restructuring and reforms 
aimed at modernizing production patterns, it is 
important to consider the changing international 
context and the strategic conditions it imposes on 
Latin America's external economic policy options. 
There is an interaction between structural factors 
(associated with technological and organizational 
innovations in the countries of the centre and their 
recent acceleration and the expectations of institu-
tional changes in economic blocs and of an unstable 
evolution in the short-term world macroeconomic 
situation. This interaction has been decisively 
changing the determinants of the strategic decisions 
of governments and transnational corporations. 
Undoubtedly, such transformations in the interna-
tional environment have an important influence -both 
positive and negative- on the ability of the Latin 
American countries to find their place in the new 
international division of labour now emerging, and to 
reformulate effectively their long-term development 
policies. Moreover, the many theoretical and 
empirical studies on the evolution of the terms of 
trade for the region indicate that the pronounced 
deterioration has spread from the characteristics of 
exported products to the characteristics of the 
exporting country, thus including the export of 
manufactures (Fritsch, 1990; Ocampo, 1990). 
These points, if confirmed, would require us to 
ponder the specific modalities of international 
insertion and the patterns of productive specialization, 
and consequently, the importance of industrial and 
trade policies in promoting levels of competitiveness 
which are acceptable in the more dynamic branches 
of international trade. A neo-structuralist frame of 
reference for industrial policy implies the more 
efficient utilization of market signals, of entre-
preneurial perception, information, coordination and 
initiative, and of international competition. Here, the 
State's responsibility is to create an institutional 
environment which stimulates the creativity and 
dynamism of the productive agents (employers and 
workers) and their capacity for agreement and 
coordination among themselves. In turn, specific 
sectoral options should not be imposed by 
government technocrats but should be a flexible result 
of those initiatives and of that coordination. It is 
basically a question of options that make maximum 
use of the information offered by domestic and 
external markets and technological, institutional and 
organizational trends (Muñoz, 1990). 
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By following this new path of industrialization 
our countries should also overcome the false dilemma 
about postponing agricultural development. It is 
recognized that the structural nature of the 
agricultural problems to be solved demands the action 
of the State on two levels. On the macroeconomic 
level, emphasis is given to the State's role in 
providing incentives aimed at taking advantage of 
potential domestic demand, but recognition is also 
given to the importance of safeguarding the stability 
of the economy. In the sectoral area, as a means of 
dealing with the risks and uncertainties characteristic 
of agriculture, the neo-structuralists advocate policies 
which guarantee prices and price ranges; techno-
logical innovations which promote the development 
of high-yield varieties resistant to pests and weather 
variations; institutional innovations aimed at creating 
and strengthening post-harvest services, futures 
markets and agricultural insurance markets; and the 
introduction into rural areas of activities to 
industrialize agricultural products (Figueroa, 1990). 
Finally, in this whole series of proposals for 
productive restructuring to fight against the scarcity 
of foreign exchange, the environmental challenges 
involved in these reforms cannot be ignored. Our 
countries must recognize, on the one hand, the 
structural origin of environmental problems, and on 
this basis elaborate alternatives and policies aimed at 
environmental sustainability. On the other hand, they 
must admit that natural resources will constitute an 
exceptional asset for the future development of Latin 
America to the extent that there is constant public 
concern and action to ensure that rational exploitation 
preserves, replaces and even expands the potential of 
this rich patrimony. 
Such objectives demand the attention of the 
highest levels of government. Tlie question of the 
environment is highly controversial and requires a 
profound adaptation of economy policy in general 
and by sector. For example, on the general level, 
priority must be given to policies dealing with science 
and technology, with institutional organization and 
with education, which encourage the incorporation of 
an environmental component into development 
strategy. In this way, our countries should create a 
model for generating, adopting and disseminating 
technology which is environment-friendly and 
reduces the ecological cost of transformations 
generated in the development process. They should 
set in motion agencies which coordinate environ-
mental actions by sector and location and which 
encourage forms of sustainable and profitable 
environmental development through permanent 
economic activities (re-training, treatment of residues, 
forests for energy, etc.). And they should elaborate on 
all levels policies for environmental education. In the 
sectoral sphere, they should promote the development 
of the forestry and agricultural sector with a proper 
regard for the behaviour and attributes of the living 
ecosystem and the extent of its transformation by 
man. On that level, particular attention should be paid 
to solving the problems of rural poverty which 
frequently lead to overexploitation of the environ-
ment (Gligo, 1990). 
2. Technology and innovation 
In retrospect and considering the historical realities of 
the time, we may criticize the Keynesian strategy for 
growth followed in the region in the past. It consisted 
mainly in ensuring the demand and integration of the 
domestic market, but it ignored productive efficiency. 
In fact, the security of the market deadened 
innovation, giving rise to a business attitude 
concerned only with profits. Our countries should 
have adopted a Schumpeterian approach in which 
incentives for production stimulate technological 
learning and innovation and mobilize an increasing 
number of entrepreneurs. 
Such a change requires a new conception "from 
within" of technological progress in support of 
institutions that promote scientific and technological 
activity for development, since one of the reasons for 
the innovation gap in the countries of the periphery 
appears to lie in the institutional diversity of their 
agents of technological change. Consequently, and as 
an example, systematic and organized research and 
development should be promoted and public policies 
should be established that spread among society some 
of the risks of that process. Likewise, an important 
factor for closing the technological gap is the creation 
of a highly developed scientific and technological 
infrastructure coordinated with productive sectors in 
the context of decisions regarding long-term 
specialization. The successful completion of this 
operation will provide access to original research and 
will thus make it possible to obtain comparative 
advantages in strategic and vanguard sectors in 
external markets. 
The reconquest of international markets with 
products of higher technological content constitutes a 
series of challenges for public policy. For example, 
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the government should encourage the participation of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in this mod-
ernization process. It should establish subcontracting 
agencies and organizations to supervise quality 
control; it should promote the innovative capacity of 
different sectors of the economy by means of 
technological management programmes and the 
dissemination of innovations; and it should provide 
financing to projects of technological innovation in 
priority areas. 
Finally, the consequences of the third 
technological revolution require profound changes in 
the social organization of production with the explicit 
objective of obtaining maximum benefit from the new 
technology. The road to development demands a 
consensus between the public and private sector, 
between worker and employer organizations, and 
between enterprises of the same sector, to guarantee 
flexibility and the capacity to adapt to the speed of 
technological change (Rodriguez, 1990). 
3. Capital formation and the use of productive 
capacity
 y 
As a consequence of the debt crisis, one of the 
distinctive features of the Latin American economies 
during the 1980s was the low rate of capital 
formation, together with a low rate of utilization of 
productive capital. There was a corresponding decline 
in ex-post productivity because both factors and their 
obvious interrelations play a decisive role in 
incorporating technological innovations and in 
entrepreneurial operations. 
It is well known that both the volume and the 
quality of investment are affected by the prevailing 
macroeconomic climate. In Latin America, emphasis 
on trade balances and stabilization ignored capital 
formation and the regulation of the level of economic 
activity. This seems to be a serious deficiency which 
-together with the crisis- helps explain the marked 
reduction in the formation of new capital and in the 
utilization of installed capacity recorded during this 
decade. 
The neo-structuralists seek to regulate capital 
movements, the exchange rate, trade policy and the 
interest rate, in order to build a stable macro-
economic framework which, as a source of 
confidence in future economic policy, promotes 
capital formation and the acquisition of comparative 
advantages as a means of taking advantage of and 
increasing investment and innovation opportunities. 
On the other hand, they also recommend direct public 
actions that affect the development of comparative 
advantages and complement private investment 
initiatives (Ffrench-Davis, 1990). 
4. The renovation of the State 
Today the State is clearly overwhelmed by demands 
and its financial position is weak, especially after the 
debt crisis. Governments have had serious difficulties 
in fulfilling their basic economic functions of 
supervising macroeconomic equilibria, promoting 
equity and avoiding stagnation with regard to foreign 
exchange, savings and investment. The neo-
structuralists recognize many of these problems and, 
following a pragmatic approach and using the lessons 
of experience, are seeking to build a consensus as 
regards the new role of the State. 
According to this consensus, where the question 
is not so much the size of the State as its capacity for 
management and concerted action, its main economic 
function can be defined as follows: it must formulate 
a strategic vision of the development process; it must 
reorder and maintain economic incentives and 
relative prices in a manner coherent with this 
strategy; and through constructive dialogue and 
concerted action, it must ensure that all social and 
political sectors are committed to this strategy. A 
State efficiently organized in this way around a 
central function, i.e., a State based on concerted 
action, would represent a new stage in Latin 
American development, characterized by an emerging 
democracy and the need to adjust the development 
strategy. 
Considering these necessary adaptations and 
redefinitions, the neo-structuralists maintain that the 
role of the State needs to be strengthened in its 
classical functions (providing public goods, 
maintaining macroeconomic equilibria and equity, 
etc.); in its basic functions (minimum transport and 
communications infrastructure, health care, housing, 
education, etc.); and in its auxiliary functions (support 
for structural competitiveness of the economy by 
promoting or simulating markets not yet in existence, 
development of the scientific and technological 
infrastructure, elimination of or compensation for the 
defects of the market, etc.). These functions are more 
important than its entrepreneurial and productive 
functions which were critical in the past but today are 
8SeeSalazar(1990). 
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less necessary. The State should reorganize its 
finances, especially by consolidating its sources of 
revenues through tax reform. As for expenditures, it 
must establish investment priorities and rational the 
public investment programme, it must also reduce 
subsidies, except for those that are truly 
redistributive. Actions to increase the efficiency of 
public enterprises are also important. For example, 
the State must limit their objectives to those that are 
productive. It must make them more competitive by 
granting them greater financial and managerial 
autonomy, by allowing them to charge prices similar 
to those of a private enterprise, by fixing "social" 
prices only in a limited and exceptional fashion, by 
subcontracting and inviting bids for auxiliary services 
and by privatizing "non-strategic" productive 
enterprises. 
Given the need for development "from within" 
for the support of an efficient State, it is essential that 
an optimal strategy for intervention should be 
designed. Neo-structuralism emphasizes the follow-
ing elements for such a strategy. 
First, since the administrative resources of the 
public sector are limited, its action cannot attempt to 
attack the innumerable distortions of the economy, 
but only the most important ones. Therefore, 
priorities must be established for State intervention. 
A second and urgent requisite is to decentralize 
and depoliticize public administration, since the more 
conflicts are resolved by the political system (as 
opposed to the market), or on a central level (as 
opposed to regional or local governments), the greater 
the burden of social demands on the central 
government, all of which creates problems for and 
As already mentioned, this final section presents a 
critical examination of the proposals we have 
analysed, in order to draw positive lessons for 
economic policy and development in Latin America. 
It would appear that on the basis of pragmatic 
considerations and the lessons of experience correctly 
interpreted, our countries are moving towards a 
compromise between the less extreme neo-liberal 
positions and the traditional economic conceptions of 
Latin American development, duly reformulated. 
overwhelms its capacity for action. Thus, if it can 
decentralize and depoliticize conflicts, this will help 
in an indirect but real way to reduce the overload and 
improve its efficiency. This rule is obviously not 
valid in the case of those defects and conflicts which 
would be poorly resolved on decentralized levels or 
by the market. 
Finally, another important issue is that of 
providing institutional counterweights to asym-
metrical pressure in favour of intervention. Since 
those who benefit from an increase of intervention are 
few (those who exert pressure) and those who benefit 
from reducing it are many (and therefore exert less 
pressure), intervention has a unidirectional character: 
it tends to increase rather than diminish. Therefore, 
automatic mechanisms should be created which 
anticipate this situation and which serve as counter 
weights. For example, a policy of differentiated tariffs 
will produce growing and rising disparities between 
sectors; tariffs not only become different but they also 
have a higher average value. Thus, when a 
differentiated policy is established, an average tariff 
can be established: every time one tariff rises, another 
one has to be lowered in compensation. This provides 
a kind of institutional counterweight against a natural 
rising trend. 
We end here the synthesis of the more 
important aspects of the neo-structuralist agenda for 
Latin American development. In the following and 
final section, we will analyse to what extent 
neo-structuralism comes close to or departs from its 
neo-liberal counterpart, which was summarized, at 
least in its main lines, in the previous section. 
This compromise between the two proposals is 
derived perhaps from frustrating experiences in one 
camp or the other, from the crisis conditions which 
continue painfully and interminably, and from the less 
ideological and more pragmatic attitudes that are 
beginning to dominate in these first years after the 
cold war. However, this does not modify the basic 
difference in the axiomatic and philosophical 
premises underlying both proposals. This is not the 
place to delve into this question, since it belongs to 
III 
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another level of abstraction. Nevertheless, it should 
be recalled, however briefly, that liberalism and 
structuralism and their corresponding "neo" versions 
conceive of and explain in very different ways the 
behaviour of the individual in society. 
The Liberals, as the heirs of individualism and 
utilitarianism, presuppose the existence of the abstract 
categories of freedom of choice and the rational 
calculations of the individual economic agent in the 
market, be he producer or consumer. This assumption 
gives shape to the most efficient forms of action. On 
the basis of this generic concept of individual 
conduct, they postulate the elimination of any 
interference that limits the people's freedom of choice 
and flexibility, especially from the State, which they 
consider to be the originator and ultimate guarantor of 
any kind of interference. 
The Structuralists, in turn, at least in Latin 
America, interpret the economic behaviour of 
individual agents according to historical contexts, 
especially of a socio-economic and institutional 
character, in which such agents formulate their 
options and develop their conduct. They consider that 
individuals form themselves into organized social 
groups in a multitude of public and private 
institutions, which develop over time a series of 
values and rules of behaviour. These forms of social 
organization constitute, in turn, veritable cultures 
which limit and orient individual conduct. Thus, 
because of their different national historical 
experience and international relations, Latin 
American societies and economies have their own 
distinctive structural and institutional characteristics, 
which proposed development policies have to take 
into account. Hence, even though the general lines of 
development policy may be very similar, considerable 
differences can persist in the sphere of action and in 
policy instruments, especially, of course, with respect 
to the role of the State. 
Against this background we can now discuss 
development proposals themselves. However, first we 
must clarify some points concerning the real roots of 
the current economic crisis in Latin America. We 
should recall again that already in the 1960s ECLAC 
was warning about the deep structural problems of 
Latin American development: excessive protec-
tionism, narrowing of the reducible margin of 
imports, huge external and fiscal imbalances together 
with a loss of economic dynamism and growing 
unemployment. Many countries of the region 
accepted the structuralist recommendations and 
elaborated economic policies aimed at correcting the 
excessive distortions by gradually and constantly 
adjusting the exchange rate, reducing and 
rationalizing tariffs and promoting exports. However, 
the overabundance of cheap external financing during 
the 1970s, the concomitant financial permissiveness 
and the mistaken signals from a deregulated financial 
market obviated the need for adjustment policies and 
exacerbated the disequilibria by covering them over 
with the veil of external indebtedness. 
In this regard, the real lost decade, from the 
perspective of opportunities and possibilities, was the 
1970s. Resources were available then for gradually 
improving the productive and financial apparatus on 
the basis of an explicit policy of restructuring and 
development. The present situation is exactly the 
opposite. External indebtedness and liberalization 
policies have made the disequilibria worse: un-
manageable external debt, critical levels of domestic 
indebtedness, severe fiscal imbalance, runaway 
inflation, vertical fall in the investment rate, etc. None 
of these problems was so acute in the early 1970s. 
Having made these clarifications, we can now 
begin the actual debate on structural adjustment in 
Latin America. A perusal of the proposals outlined in 
the preceding sections shows that both the neo-
liberals and the neo-structuralists agree on the im-
mediate need for profound changes in the economic 
structure of our countries. Nevertheless, there is 
considerable disagreement about the policies needed 
to introduce those changes, and about the size of the 
role played by the State and the market in the strategy 
of recovering and consolidating development. 
Originally, the neo-structuralists wanted to 
provide an alternative to the orthodox neo-liberal 
view of adjustment. They sought less recessive and 
less regressive solutions to the problems of inflation 
and trade imbalance through the stabilization and 
heterodox adjustment programmes of the 1980s 
(Lustig, 1988). Like that of the neo-liberalists, theirs 
was an essentially short-term approach. But, to the 
extent that many of the adjustment plans of either side 
failed and the crisis persisted, the neo-structuralists 
returned for inspiration to the positive legacy of a 
specifically Latin American doctrine: the struc-
turalism of the post-war decades. Despite this close 
identification with the original structuralist arguments 
and as a consequence of the change of historical 
circumstances in which they were formulated, the 
neo-structuralists revised some of their assumptions 
and tried to remedy their deficiencies. These included 
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an excessive confidence in the value of State 
intervention, an exaggerated and overly prolonged 
pessimism about external markets, and an incautious 
management of short-term economic policy which 
failed to provide timely and practical answers to 
conjunctural problems, particularly by under-
estimating the monetary and financial position 
(Rosales, 1988). Thus, they recognized explicitly that 
recommendations cannot be made for the long term 
without a clear picture of the possible repercussions 
of structural change and without devising methods of 
handling problems arising from the transition (Lustig, 
1988). 
From this new standpoint, which shows an 
undeniable concern for development in its broadest 
sense, the neo-structuralists have criticized neo-
liberalism mainly because of the extreme nature of its 
policy agenda. They consider it to be closer to the old 
sayings about the moral superiority of the market than 
to economic rationality and empirical corroboration 
of its practical successes in the real world. This 
impression is clearest in the discussion about the 
State's role in the economy. In particular, the 
neo-liberalists avoid any discussion of the effective 
capacity of State administration and its ability to 
change economic incentives and the mechanisms and 
institutional processes for decision-making. What 
they want in practice is the automatic reduction of the 
size of the public sector with no clear theoretical 
backing for its relation to economic growth. 
This attitude is clearly reflected in proposals like 
that of Selowsky (1989) which seek to achieve a 
fiscal surplus by reducing expenditures in a context of 
reforms designed to reduce taxes, all of which 
constantly undermine the financial capacity of the 
public sector. Besides the indispensable moderniza-
tion of the system for collecting taxes and controlling 
tax evasion, the tax structure would have to be 
reorganized so as to give greater relative weight to 
income and property taxes. To some extent, this 
would be a return to the progressive taxation which 
the crisis and neo-liberal policies have been reducing 
(Rosales, 1990). Similarly, the justification for 
privatization is based especially on criticisms which 
emphasize the poor performance of public 
enterprises, the negative fiscal effects of unprofitable 
enterprises and the defects and inefficiencies 
supposedly inherent in public administration. 
However, the structure of the markets is just as 
important -or even more so- in explaining the 
comparative performance of enterprises, not to 
mention management objectives in themselves which 
escape conventional norms for evaluating a private 
enterprise. Moreover, the fiscal impact can be 
negative when profitable public enterprises are 
privatized (Salazar, 1990). 
Consequently, because of this ideological 
assumption that the origin of every imbalance lies in 
the public sector, neo-liberal policy-makers are very 
sensitive to any imbalance in this sector, while almost 
completely ignoring the possibility that the private 
sector might have a destabilizing influence.9 The 
neo-liberal experience in the Southern Cone during 
the mid-1970s revealed that private interests could 
seriously destabilize the economy, either because they 
made mistakes in their inflationary expectations or 
because they created financial bubbles out of 
collective euphoria and monetary permissiveness. 
They forgot that these private interests could follow 
anti-social or even counterproductive policies in a 
context of a serious and widespread lack of competi-
tion and of broad disequilibria (Ramos, 1984). 
Nevertheless, we must heed the neo-liberal 
warning of the dangers of the limitless expansion of 
State management, which results when the 
government tries to satisfy the interests of the more 
organized groups in society rather than the common 
good. For this reason, the neo-structuralists stress that 
the public sector must be modernized, depolitized and 
decentralized; that an optimum intervention strategy 
must be designed for deliberately promoting devel-
opment; and that selectivity, competitiveness and 
professionalism must be the main guidelines for the 
social efficiency of public action (Ffrench-Davis, 
1988). 
On the other hand, the neo-liberals argue quite 
logically that markets should be liberalized and price 
mechanisms rationalized. But they have become 
unilaterally obsessed with exogenous or government-
imposed distortions and fail to observe how the 
economic system behaves when a market plagued 
with endogenous or intrinsic distortions is liberated, a 
basic concern of the neo-structuralists. Clearly, there 
is no basis in economic theory for a policy that tries 
They also ignore the complementary character or the 
crowding-in of public and private investment, especially as regards 
infrastructure, technological promotion and the level of public 
social expenditure, all of which leads us to question their desire to 
cut off resources to the public sector and limit its capacity for 
action in areas as relevant as the development of our economies and 
public Investment. 
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to limit all the distortions imposed by the 
government, whether in the trading system or on the 
home front, while ignoring endogenous distortions 
and the specific structures of the markets. 
The neo-structuralists feel that structural 
distortions are the main cause of economic problems 
and largely explain the persistence of the region's 
underdevelopment. But they also recognize that 
these distortions give rise to defects and errors in 
economic policy. Hence, they want to complement 
the action of the market with vigorous and selective 
State action in order to remedy the serious structural 
imperfections which are still prevalent in our 
economies. However, owing to the asymmetrical 
nature of the pressures for State intervention -in 
favour of more and not less intervention- the 
neo-structuralist suggestion about defining automatic 
institutional counterweights is particularly relevant 
for preventing this situation. 
In addition, in the formulation of a commercial 
strategy, the neo-liberalists tend to establish a strict 
equivalence between export-promotion policies and 
free-trade policies based on the principles of static 
comparative advantages, the absence of State 
intervention in the price system, and in some cases, 
laissez faire, and the marked absence of an active and 
promotional role for the State. Therefore, even though 
the neo-liberal critics of development strategy are 
right to insist on the importance of utilizing external 
markets as dynamic sources of demand, we may 
question their tendency to assign equal importance to 
outward-looking policies, free trade and the absence 
of State intervention (Salazar, 1990). 
The neo-structuralists have a substantial interest 
in devising the best means of promoting external 
competitiveness. The reduction of trade barriers can 
be considered an indispensable initial step, but even 
so, it is clearly insufficient. Indeed, if they are to 
improve their trade insertion over the medium term, 
our countries must achieve a competitiveness 
reinforced by technological innovations and pro-
ductivity increases going far beyond the short-term 
earnings which can motivate the rationalization of 
price incentives. Such a challenge involves the more 
10
 As Anne Kroeger recognizes, the analysis of the effects on 
well-being of alternative trade policies (and of others) becomes 
excessively complex when it is assumed that it is impossible to 
eliminate all distortions. When attention is centred on the effects of 
changing a policy instrument, while keeping in place the distortions 
in other parts of the system, the general theory of the second-best 
indicates that anything can happen (Salazar, 1990). 
structural elements of the economy which are related 
to technological policy, industrial policy and the 
educational system and which are systematized in the 
norms of international competitiveness now in effect. 
In this regard, the concern with trade liberalization is 
only part of a broader problem : how to coordinate and 
modernize the productive apparatus and make it more 
competitive (Rosales, 1990). 
In another area it is interesting to note the extent 
of the agreement between the two proposals that there 
can be no definitive solution to the crisis without 
reversing the net transfer of resources from Latin 
America to the exterior. The difference lies in the 
degree of confidence which the advocates of 
structural adjustment have in a solution proposed by 
the international banks, the multinational credit 
agencies and the governments of the industrialized 
nations -a solution which the debtor countries 
would have to support with an open-door policy for 
foreign investment.1 The neo-structuralists want 
the Latin American countries to adopt a more 
decisive attitude and recommend a negotiated total or 
partial suspension of external transfers, provided that 
they undertake to channel the resources thus released 
into a national fund for productive restructuring and 
social development to finance projects mainly 
designed to increase the efficient production of 
tradeable goods and to tackle the most serious social 
problems (Sunkel, 1990). 
Finally, we should ponder the dramatic recessive 
and regressive effects of the neo-liberal experiments 
in structural adjustment. The emphasis on reducing 
aggregate expenditure in order to achieve minimum 
macroeconomic stability and manageable external 
imbalances has led to a sharp decline of the product, 
high unemployment and sharp cuts in real wages. 
Moreover, in the fiscal counterpart of this recessive 
adjustment, the reduction of public expenditure was 
concentrated in social services and investment. As a 
result, the poorer sectors have become much worse 
off and the possibilities of future growth have been 
seriously threatened. 
In Rosales' opinion (1990), it remains to be seen whether 
or not the debtor countries can count on ex-ante external support 
which would facilitate stabilization and structural reforms. For the 
author, external financing has not functioned in this way for many 
of the Latin American economies, and the failure of the Baker 
initiative and Mexico's difficult negotiations to begin to reduce the 
debt under the Brady initiative are good examples of this. In fact, 
the con ditiona lily arising from the debt crisis is considered to be the 
main instrument for exerting pressure in favour of structural 
adjustment, which would ultimately open the doors to capital and 
private external financing. 
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It is no surprise, then, that the neo-structuralists 
share the concern for policies which re-establish basic 
macroeconomic equilibria, but at the smallest 
possible recessive cost. Theoretical considerations 
and well-grounded empirical observations provide 
evidence that heterodox adjustment programmes may 
prevent a recession or at least minimize its effects. 
Such programmes -whose less recessive character 
has already been recognized in studies representative 
of a more orthodox line (Selowsky, 1989)- call for 
policies that not only control aggregate demand but 
also, as regards adjustment, provide a sharp initial 
stimulus to the reallocation of resources towards the 
production of treadable goods, and as regards 
stabilization, influence expectations through price and 
income policies. The consideration that equity is a 
prerequisite for, rather than the result of the 
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sustainability of every development process explains 
the greater emphasis given to productivity instead of 
aid in the social efforts of governments. Undoubtedly, 
if they follow these criteria, they will have a better 
chance of achieving an adjustment with growth and 
more equity. 
There must also be a permanent concern for the 
political and social implications of each economic 
change. This special aspect of structuralist policy 
makes it impossible to treat these issues with the idea 
of joining forces to counteract opposition to the 
reforms. Rather, the State must call for concerted 
action to promote cooperation instead of conflict 
between the social partners so that they decisively 
commit themselves to a more equitable and 
democratic vision of national development. 
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